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ANTITRUST LAW: A NEW DEFENSE TO SECTION 7
OF THE CLAYTON ACT
United States v. GeneralDynamics Corp., 94 S. Ct. 1186 (1974)
The Justice Department brought suit against General Dynamics Corporation alleging violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, and sought divestiture
of United Electric Coal Companies by General Dynamics. 2 The trial court entered judgment for the defendant. 3 Although finding that the government's
statistical evidence might be sufficient to support a determination of undue
concentration in the absence of other considerations, 4 the Supreme Court, on
direct appeal," affirmed and HELD, other pertinent factors affecting the coal
industry and the business of the defendants mandated a conclusion that no
substantial lessening of competition occurred or was threatened by the acquisition of United Electric Coal by General Dynamics.6
The purpose of federal antitrust legislation7 is to prevent concentration in
the American economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in
business.8 The Sherman Antitrust Act2 was passed in 1890 to combat monop-

1. Clayton Act §7, 15 U.S.C. §18 (1970) reads in part: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall
acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly."
2. In 1954, Material Service Corporation, a large midwest producer and supplier of building materials, concrete, limestone, and coal began acquiring stock of United Electric Coal
Companies. By 1970 United Electric operated only strip or open pit mines in Illinois. Previously, all of Material Service's coal production had come from deep-shaft mines. By 1959,
Material Service had gained effective control of United Electric. During that year Material
Service was acquired by General Dynamics Corporation, a large diversified company. As a
result of the acquisition, General Dynamics became the nation's fifth largest commercial coal
producer.
3. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. II1. 1972).
4. 94 S.Ct. 1186, 1194 (1974).
5. Pursuant to the Expediting Act §2, 15 U.S.C. §29 (1970), which provides: "In every
action brought in any district court of the United States under any of said Acts, wherein the
United States is complainant, an appeal from the final judgment of the district court will
lie only to the Supreme Court:' The term "said Acts" refers to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§1-7, the Interstate Commerce Act, chs. 1, 8, 12, 13, 19 of title 49, U.S.C., "or any other
Acts having a like purpose that hereafter may be enacted." 15 U.S.C. §28 (1970).
6. 94 S.Ct. 1194 (1974) (Douglas, Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ. dissenting).
7. See generally HozraAN's ANTrrRusr LAw AND TECHNIQUES (M. Hoffman & A. Winard
eds. 1963). Among the more important antitrust measures passed by Congress are: the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1970), passed in July 1890; the Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C.
§§12-27 (1970), amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§13a, 13b, 21a (1970),
adopted in 1936, and by the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, 15 U.S.C. §18 (1970); the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § §41-46, 47-58 (1970).
8. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1970).
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olies and other restraints of trade.' 0 Its shortcoming was that it was directed
against the realization rather than the expectation of monopoly." In order to
eliminate this deficiency, Congress included section 7 in the Clayton Act of
1914.12 Section 7 "was intended to arrest anticompetitive tendencies in their
incipiency."' 3
Prior to the instant case, the Supreme Court had developed a systematic
method of examining acquisitions to determine whether section 7 had been
violated."4 First, the Court would determine the relevant market in which a
substantial lessening of competition was threatened. The relevant market, or
area of effective competition, was determined by reference to a product market
(the "line of commerce")a 5 and a geographic market (the "section of the
country").1 6
The relevant product market has traditionally been determined by the
reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand 17 between
10. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1911).
11. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 444 (1920).
12. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 321, 38 Stat. 730.
13. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963). When first enacted, §7 referred only to corporate acquisitions of stock and share capital. It is not clear
why Congress overlooked asset acquisition as a form of combination, but this method soon
became the normal business practice. With the approval of the Supreme Court (see F.T.C. v.
Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926)) §7 soon became a dead letter. United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 341. After repeated attempts at closing the assets acquisition loophole, Congress passed the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch.
1184, 64 Stat. 1125, amending Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, §7, 38 Stat. 731. The purpose of
the 1950 amendment was "to make it clear that the bill applies to all types of mergers and
acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate as well as horizontal." H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1949). The Supreme Court supported this purpose in United States v. E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957), stating: "Section 7 is designed to arrest in
itsincipiency not only the substantial lessening of competition from the acquisition by one
corporation of the whole or any part of the stock of a competing corporation, but also to
arrest in their incipiency restraints or monopolies in a relevant market which, as a reasonable
probability, appear at the time of the suit likely to result from the acquisition by one
corporation of all or any part of the stock of any other corporation."
14. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co.v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
15. Id. at 324. The parenthetical phrase is the language of the statute, 15 U.S.C. §18
(1970).
16. Id.
17. A basic principle of economic theory is that the demand for certain goods tends to
vary with the price. Normally, as the price of goods increases, the quantity of the goods
demanded will be less, and if the price decreases, the quantity demanded will be greater.
Different goods vary in the degree to which the demand for them changes in response to a
change in price. If a large change in the quantity of goods demanded results from a relatively small change in price, the demand for the goods is said to be "elastic." Conversely, if
the change in quantity demanded is small compared to the change in price, demand is
termed "inelastic."
Of course, factors other than price affect the demand for goods. Among these factors are
the prices of substitutes for and complements of the goods. An increase in the price of goods
will tend to increase the demand for all of its substitutes. On the other hand, an increase
in the price of goods, which complements - rather than competes with - other goods will
tend to reduce the demand for the other goods. The cross-elasticity of demand for goods (A)
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the product itself and substitutes for it.' Within this broad product market,
well-defined submarkets have also been held to exist that, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes.'19
In determining the appropriate section of the country the court has traditionally asked whether the effect of the merger on competition will be direct
and immediate. 20 Relevant geographic markets have been found to be a city
and the surrounding four-county area,21 the state of California,22 the south23
eastern part of the United States, and the entire nation.24
Both the relevant product and geographic markets must be sufficiently inclusive to be meaningful in terms of the trade realities of the particular firm
or industry. Otherwise it would be practically impossible to apply the pro-

hibition of section 7 in the case of an acquired firm producing numerous inconsequential and minor products. The words of section 7 "any line of commerce" are not synonymous with the entire line of commerce, or all lines of
in terms of goods (B) is expressed:
-

% change in quantity of A demanded
% change in price of B

If cross-elasticity is positive, then the two goods are complementary. If cross-elasticity is
negative, then the two goods are substitutes, that is, they have interchangeable uses. If crosselasticity is zero, the two goods are independent in consumption, they are neither complements nor substitutes, but are neutral vis-a-vis each other. See L. REYNoLDs, ECONoMICS, A
GENERAL INTRODUCrION 100-12 (rev. ed. 1966); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMIcs, AN INmODUarost
ANALYsIS 367-74, 524 (4th ed. 1958).

18. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
19. "The boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the producer's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct
customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors." Id. See, e.g.,
United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1957), where the
Court found that "automotive finishes and fabrics have sufficient peculiar characteristics and
uses to constitute them products sufficiently distinct from all other finishes and fabrics to
make them a 'line of commerce' within the meaning of the Clayton Act." Cf. Van Camp &
Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245, 253 (1929), wherein the Court stated: "[I'he
phrase ['in any line of commerce'] is comprehensive and means that if the forbidden effect
or tendency is produced in one out of all the various lines of commerce, the words 'in any
line of commerce' literally are satisfied." (Emphasis in original.)
20. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963).
21. In studying a bank merger in Philadelphia, the Supreme Court compromised on a
"fair intermediate delineation which avoids the extremes of drawing the market so expansively as to make the effect of the merger upon competition seem insignificant, because
only the very largest customers are taken into account in defining the market, or so narrowly as to place the appellees [the two Philadelphia banks proposing merger] in different
markets, because only the smallest customers are considered." Id. at 359-62. See Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962).
22. Determined at trial, without opinion, and accepted without question by the Supreme
Court. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1964).
23. Announced as "not disputed." United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158,

161 (1964).
24. "The relationships of product value, bulk, weight and consumer demand" enabled
two shoe manufacturers contemplating merger to distribute their shoes on a nationwide
basis, and in fact, both did." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328 (1962).
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commerce engaged in or touched upon by the acquired firm. In fact, "[t]he
line of commerce need not even be a large part of the business of any of the
25
corporations involved."
The second step of section 7 analysis has traditionally been the evaluation
of the probable anticompetitive effects of the acquisition within the relevant
markets. In this analysis the Supreme Court has not required the anticompetitive power to manifest itself in anticompetitive action before section 7 was
deemed to have been violated. 26 The Court has interpreted Congress' words

"may tend substantially to lessen competition" as indicating concern with
probabilities rather than certainties.27 But proof of a mere possibility will not
satisfy the statute. 28 Thus, the Court has appraised the immediate impact of
the acquisition upon competition as well as its probable impact on future
competitive conditions. 29 During the sixty-year life of section 7, the federal
judiciary has identified numerous factors to be considered in determining
whether an acquisition has an anticompetitive effect.30
In the instant case the trial court followed the traditional approach. Based
upon the extensive evidence presented at trial concerning the coal industry,
the court concluded that the energy market was the appropriate line of commerce 31 and that two freight rate districts within Illinois3z comprised the
25. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. F.T.C., 296 F.2d 800, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1961).
26. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967). Thus, the
enforcement of §7 need not wait until an anticompetitive effect is realized, but may be
initiated when the power to bring about an anticompetitive effect is developed.
27. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
28. United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 568, 598 (1957).
29. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966).
30. "Validity [of a horizontal merger] in the face of antitrust laws will depend on such
factors as: the relative size and number of the parties of the arrangement; whether it allocates shares of the market among the parties; whether it fixes prices at which the parties
will sell their products; or whether it absorbs or insulates competitors." Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334-35 (1962). "The factors include: (1) foreclosure of the
competitors at either level from a segment of the market; (2) the purpose of the merger;
(3) likely adverse effects on local business; (4) the trend toward concentration; (5) the trend
toward vertical integration; and (6) the barriers to entry by new firms." Mississippi River
Corp. v. F.T.C., 454 F.2d 1083, 1091 (8th Cir. 1972). Other factors considered include: the
convenience and needs of the community, United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171
(1968); the degree of control acquired, Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485
(1967); the structure, history, and future of the market and the size of the parties to the
acquisition, United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); position or rank in
the market and share of the market, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962);
competition from other products, United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). This listing is not exhaustive.
31. 341 F. Supp. at 555. The court based its conclusion on "extensive evidence" as to
interfuel competition including: the fuel use of industrial and utility consumers; competition
with coal from gas, oil, nuclear energy, and multienergy companies; the effects of air pollution restrictions and statement techniques, But see Schwartzman, The Cross-Elasticity of
Demand and Industry Boundaries: Coal, Oil, Gas, and Uranium, 18 ANTrl-uSTr BULL. 483
(1973), which concludes that residual oil is a substitute for coal, but that uranium and
natural gas are not.
32. Freight rate districts, designated by the Interstate Commerce Commission for determining rail transportation rates, reflect transportation arteries and freight charges that
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relevant section of the country3s
The trial court then examined the acquisition's effect on competition
within the relevant market. Although the court found a decrease in the num34
ber of firms, one of the factors indicating an anticompetitive concentration,
the court determined that it was not due to small firms being acquired by
large firms, but that it was an inevitable result of the change in the nature of
the demand for coal.3 5 Additionally, the trial court found that the acquired
company's presently available coal reserves were largely committed to the fulfillment of long-term contracts with utility companies, thus greatly restricting
the company's ability to contribute meaningfully to competition36 The court
consequently concluded that the acquisition did not adversely affect competition.
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's conclusions. In its
analysis the Court accepted three major factual findings of the trial court: (1)

coal has become increasingly less able to compete with other sources of energy
in many segments of the energy market; (2) to a growing extent since 1954
the electric utility industry has become the mainstay of coal consumption; (3)
most significantly, to an increasing degree, nearly all coal sold to utilities is

transferred under long-term requirements contracts.3 In view of these fundamental changes in the structure of the market for coal and the low amount
of presently available coal reserves owned by United Electric, the Supreme
Court, contrary to prior decisions,38 determined that evidence of past production does not necessarily give a proper picture of a company's future ability
to compete.39
determine the cost of delivered coal to purchasers and thus the competitive position of
various coal producers.
33. 341 F. Supp. at 557. The district court rejected the government's contention that the
effect of the combination should be examined within the coal "submarket" in the state of
Illinois and in the Eastern Interior Coal Province. Id. at 555-56. Compare the district court's
determination of the relevant product market, with United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
168 F. Supp. 576, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1958): "Any definition of a line of commerce which ignores
the buyers and focuses on what the sellers do . . .is not meaningful." Cf. Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
The Eastern Interior Coal Province named by United States Geological Survey maps, describes one portion of a sequence of coal-bearing rock formations known geologically as the
Pennsylvania System. The Province is comprised of Illinois, Indiana, and parts of Kentucky,
Tennessee, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Missouri. The boundaries are based on the assumption that, given the high cost of transporting coal, producers of coal will have a clear
competitive advantage in sales in the immediate areas of the mine. The Province is much
larger than freight rate districts, see note 32 supra, which are usually no larger than a few
counties. The Supreme Court dissent expressed strong exception to the district court's
delineation of the relevant geographic market, depicting it as so narrowly drawn as to place
appellees in different markets. 94 S.Ct. at 1204. See note 21 supra.
34. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See also note 27 supra.
35. 341 F. Supp. at 558.
36. Id. at 559.
37. 94 S.Ct. at 1194-95.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
39. 94 &,Ct. at 1195.
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In justifying this departure from traditional section 7 analysis, the Court
seems to have carved out a new affirmative defense to antitrust challenges
where the defendant can demonstrate that some other measure of future competitive power is more relevant than past production and sales figures. Such a
and to firms
defense would be useful to firms engaged in resource-extraction
40
structure.
market
their
in
changes
drastic
faced with
41
Both the Government and dissent in the instant case argued that the
majority was doing nothing more than applying a "failing company" defense
in an inappropriate case. The failing company defense was first announced in
InternationalShoe Co. v. F.T.C.42 As explained in that case, a company invoking the defense has a burden of showing that its resources were so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the grave
probability of a business failure. 43 The Supreme Court later added the requirement that the company had tried and failed to merge with a company other
than the acquiring one. 44 Under these circumstances the possible adverse effect of a merger on competition is viewed as less harmful than advantageous
in saving creditors, owners, and employees of the failing business from impending loss. The failing company defense is therefore narrow in scope. It
does not apply to the sale of a profitable enterprise as a going concern, even
if the owner had made a firm and unqualified decision to liquidate the
45
business.
In the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart agreed with the Government
and the dissenters that the failing company doctrine was inappropriate in the
instant case. Rather, Justice Stewart pointed out that United Electric's weak
reserve position confirmed the company's inability to compete for long-term
contracts. 4 6 Thus, the new antitrust defense is designed not for firms on the
very brink of financial disaster47 but for firms, while currently healthy, suffering
from a latent terminal illness.
The distinction between the new antitrust defense and the failing company
defense seems to be largely a matter of timing: the new defense permits a
merger much earlier than the failing company defense. But an element of
certainty is essential to both. In order to use the new defense successfully, a
firm must be able to show that there is no cure for its terminal disease.
The Supreme Court's decision in the instant case will greatly affect antitrust law with respect to the treatment of post-acquisition evidence. Section 7
40. "We think that the admission of postacquisition data is proper only in the unusual
case in which the structure of the market has changed radically since the merger." Procter &
Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1559 (1963).
41. The dissenting opinion was authored by Mr. Justice Douglas.
42. 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
43. Id. at 802.
44. United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969).
45. See Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. F.T.C., 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961).
46. 94 S.Ct. at 1199.
47. If, as in this case, a company uses up resources it cannot replace, it must die like a
body consumed by cancer. It cannot commit itself to continued production; it cannot effectively compete with healthy competitors, no matter how healthy it had been in the past.
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of the Clayton Act is concerned with the arrest of anticompetitive effects of a
corporate acquisition, not only at the time of the acquisition, but at "any time
when the acquisition threatens to ripen into the prohibited effect."' 48 Thus,
post-acquisition evidence may be considered in determining whether the
merger violates the statute. The Supreme Court had previously warned against
giving too much weight to post-acquisition evidence because of the effects on
management of the pending government antitrust suit 9 and because the force
of section 7 is in probalities and not in what later transpires in fact.5 0 In
the instant case, however, the Court rejected the import of the government's
statistical evidence of past production and based its decision largely on postacquisition evidence: the changed structure of the coal market and the acquired company's expected inability to compete therein. Further, the Court
reasoned that these special circumstances completely refuted the government's
contentions of anticompetitive effects and therefore declined to reach the
question of whether the district court had properly delineated the relevant
product and geographic markets. The Court conceded that a determination of
relevant markets is a necessary precondition to assessment of the probabilities
of a substantial effect on competition within them. The Court rationalized its
break with traditional antitrust analysis by holding that in the principal case
the government's statistical presentation simply did not establish that a substantial lessening of competition was likely to occur in any market.51
The new defense is a drastic departure from traditional section 7 analysis.
Its reliance on post-acquisition evidence precludes the need for determining
relevant markets and permits acquisition of a waning firm much earlier than
the failing company doctrine. Thus, in cases really involving nothing more
than an expected inability to compete, section 7 may be a dead letter.
DAVID

48.
49.
50.
51.

M. ROGERO

United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 US. 586, 597 (1957).
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441,463 (1964).
F.T.C. v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965).
94 S.Ct. at 1200.
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